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II 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
On June 7th, 1999, the Appellant was sentenced to serve a 
term of imprisonment in the amount of Fourteen, (14), years. Of 
those 14 years, the first 7 years were ordered to be served as 
the determinate, or "fixed" portion. This was to be followed by a 
period of seven, (7), years indeterminate. A copy of the Judgment 
and Sentence is attached as Exhibit A. 
At the time that the sentence was imposed, the Appellant was 
ordered to receive credit for time served, (pre-sentence), in the 
amount of 270 days. 
The Appellant was paroled on September 6th, 2005, after serving 
the seven, (7), year determinate portion of the sentence imposed. 
At the time the Appellant was paroled, the full term expiration 
date of the sentence was September 5th, 2012. 
The appellant was arrested, pursuant to an agents warrant, on 
October 22nd, 2008. The warrant was issued for the purported 
testing of my urine, which produced three "dirty urinalysis" tests. 
(U.A.s) . 
The State of Idaho, at the revocational hearing, also claimed 
that I was being violated because I had been given a traffic 
infraction two years earlier in 2006. 
The Board of Pardons and Parole, (Also known as the Parole 
commission), hereinafter known as the Board, informed me that I 
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would be again released upon parole if I enrolled in and completed 
a program known as "Anger Management". At no time did the Board 
ever inform the Appellant that he would lose any time that he 
had served while on parole. The Appellant completed this program, 
and on January 27th, 2009 he was again released upon parole. 
It was after the parole revocation hearing in October of 2008, 
that I asked my case manager, Mr. Tony Marsh, if I had lost any 
"street time". (street time is the time served on parole). Mr. 
Marsh informed me that if the Board had not personally notified 
me as to the loss of any street time, then I had not lost this 
time. 
While I was attending the anger management course, at the 
Twin Falls community work center, I received a "time computation 
sheet" from the Department of Corrections. As I read this time 
computation sheet, I noticed that my discharge date had been 
moved from September 5th, 2012, to July 27th, 2014, an amount of 
678 days. I was never present when this was done. I was never given 
any form of notice that I had lost this time. 
As was previously stated, on January 27th, 2009. I was granted 
a parole. 
Again, on September 24th, 2009, an agents warrant was issued 
for my arrest. When I learned that there was a warrant for my 
arrest, I tried to turn myself in at the Parole Office, but I 
was informed that, "I was free to go". I was informed that I was 
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"Free to go" by Mr. Gary Taylor. Mr. Taylor did ask me to report 
back to the Parole Office on the following Monday. (I obviously 
did not return on Monday). 
I was eventually arrested on this warrant on October 30th, 
2009. 
I was given a revocational hearing on March 19th, 2010. At 
this revocational hearing, I was informed that I would be granted 
a tentative parole release date upon completion of the therapeutic 
community program. (T.C.). 
I completed the T.C. program, and on February 18th, 2011, I 
was again granted a parole. However, just prior to my release, I 
was given a new time computation sheet from the records department 
of the Department of Corrections. This time computation sheet 
shows that my full term expiration date had been adjusted to April 
15th, 2015. This would be an adjustment of 262 days from where it 
had previously been adjusted. At no time was I ever informed by 
the Board that I would lose any of the time that I served upon 
parole. 
On September 27th, 2011 I was arrested for violating the terms 
of my parole. I was given a revocational hearing on April 24th, 
2012. Once more, during this revocational process it was never 
told to me that I would forfeit any of the time that I had served 
upon parole. 
At this revocational hearing, I was informed that I would 
not be considered for parole for another two years. 
This action is forcing me to serve longer than the 14 years 
I was sentenced to serve. 
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At none of the revocational hearings did the Board ever inform 
the Appellant that he was not going to be credited with the time 
that he had served while on parole. 
During the time that the Appellant was on parole, he was 
always current with the costs of his supervision. 
During the time that the Appellant was on parole, the 
Board allowed the Appellant to enter into and complete an in-
patient drug and alcohol program. 
The Board has also taken from the Appellant this time that 
he served in this in-patient program. This in-patient program 
cost the Appellant $10,000. 
The Appellant sought a Writ of Habeas Corpus in the Fourth 
Judicial District Court. 
That Court charged the Appellant $88.00, (to be paid in 
payments), and then dismissed the Petition without ever having 
it served upon the respondents. 
Then, when the Appellant files a Notice of Appeal, the Court 
denies to the Appellant the ability to proceed In Forma Pauperis, 
but tells the Appellant, " .. I'm not saying that you can not file 
an appeal. I'm just saying you can appeal only if you can pay the 
filing fee for the Clerk's Record on Appeal". This was an 
additional $100.00. 
This is an act of denial of equal protection of the law. (The 
Appellant can appeal if he has money but not if he is poor). 
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1 ) • 
ARGUMENT OF LAW 
Has the Appellant been denied Due Process of 
Law when the District Court failed to follow 
controlling precedent from the Idaho state 
Supreme Court? 
On June 25th, 2012, the Honorable Judge Hurlbutt, when he 
dismissed the Petition for a Writ of Habeas Corpus, stated, 
" .•. It is settled law in Idaho that a prisoner is not 
entitled to credit for time served on parole, after 
he violates the terms of his parole and the failure 
to grant to the prisoner such credit does not violate 
his constitutional rights". 
In response to this statement, (And to the order of 
dismissal), the Appellant informed the Court, in a Motion to 
reconsider the Judgment, of the case of :E'KfRJ.fe Prout, 12 Idaho 
494, 86 P.275, (1906); where the Court held, 
irA prisoner who has been paroled by the Board 
of pardons, and thereafter re-arrested and returned 
to the Penitentiary, is entitled to his discharge 
at the expiration of the period for which he 
was sentenced by the Court, and he cannot be 
detained for the purpose of serving an additional 
amount of time equaling the time he was out on parole". 
§20-233. 
It is the position of the Appellant that this is still 
good law in the state of Idaho under §20-233. 
It is the position of the Appellant that this applies to 
him individually because the Appellant has served more than the 
time he was ordered to serve by the Sentencing Court, and, 
under §20-233, it is clear that he must be released on that date, 
and the time that he was out on parole may not be used to keep 
him incarcerated beyond that time. please see In Re Prout, Supra. 
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Attached as Exhibit A, is a copy of the Judgment and Sentence 
as was entered in this case. 
The Sentencing order was entered on June 7th, 1999. The same 
Order granted to the Appellant 277 days of presentence incarceration 
credit. (It should be noted that Exhibit A is an amended Sentencing 
Order, and that the original order was entered on June 7th, lfl(JCf). 
Under any form of algorithm, the sentence imposed will be discharged 
on September 4th, 2012. 
This is exactly 14 years from the date of the imposition of 
the sentence, less the time credit of 277 days. 
It is because the District Court refused to obey the ruling 
of the state Supreme Court, in the case ~f In Re Prout, Supra, 
that the Appellant is still incarcerated. 
Because the District Court refused to follow the case precedent 
of In Re Prout, Supra, the Appellant has been denied Due Process 
of Law. 
2). The Sentencing Order in this case is unique, and 
mandates that the Appellant will not be in custody 
and or supervised by the Board of Corrections for 
more than 14 years. 
A copy of the amended judgment and sentencinq order is attached 
as Exhibit A. 
Very clearly, on page 2 of that order, at lines 1 through 3, 
it is clearly stated as follows: 
" ... the defendant be committed to the custody and 
SUPERVISION of the Idaho State Board of Corrections, 
for a period not to exceed fourteen, (14), years." 
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The Appellant was sentenced on June 7th, 1999, and was given 
credit for time served in the amount of 277 days. 
This would mean that on September 4th, 2012, the Appellant 
has been in the ....•. custody and supervision of the Board of 
Corrections for fourteen, (14), years. 
Based upon this fact, the Appellant has totally discharged 
his judgment as imposed upon him by the Court, and Due Process of 
Law would demand that the Appellant be released immediately from 
prison. 
The State of Idaho, and the Fourth Judicial district court, 
disagreed with the Appellant, stating that the time he spent under 
the supervision, (and in custody of the Board of Corrections), does 
not count toward the discharge of his sentence. That the Board has 
the authority to take this time served away from the Appellant. 
Most individuals who are sentenced to serve a term of 
imprisonment in the State of Idaho, are not sentenced to a term of 
custody AND SUPERVISION. 
Most individuals who are sentenced to a term of imprisonment 
in the State of Idaho, are sentenced to serve a mini"Um, or a 
determinate term, (Called a "fixed" term), followed by an 
indeterminate term. This indeterminate term is usually left to the 
discretion of the Board of Corrections as to the length of time 
served incarcerated or on parole. 
Because of the unique sentencing Order in this case, (Because 
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the sentencing Court ordered that the defendant was commi tted to the 
custody AND SUPERVISION to the Board of corrections for a term not 
to exceed fourteen, (14), years), and because the Appellant has 
served more than a total amount of 14 years in the custody and the 
supervision of the Board of Corrections, the Appellant is entitled 
to be released from the custody and supervision of the Board. 
The United states Supreme Court, in the case of Jones V. 
Cunningham, 371 U.S. 236, (1963), stated that "time served upon 
parole is to be considered as "in custody" for purposes of credit 
for time served. 
More recently, the United States Supreme Court stated as 
follows: 
" ... since an individual must surrender a number of 
Constitutional rights and is subject to additional 
requirements as ordered by the Supervising Officer, 
the individual is thereby paying a debt for his offense, 
and this is to be considered as part of the punishment 
for his offense, and this type of supervision is to be 
considered a variation of incarceration". please see, 
Sampson V. California, 547 U.S. 843, at 850, (2006). 
Closer to horne, here in Idaho, the Idaho State Supreme Court 
has stated, 
"Parole merely allows a convicted party to serve 
part of his sentence under conditions other than 
those of the State Penitentiary". Standlee V. State, 
96 Idaho 849, 538 P.2d 778, (1975). 
Under the above cited cases, it is clear that being released 
upon parole, and the time served upon parole, is to be considered 
as "In custody" for purposes of credit for time served. 
The State of Idaho, by and through the Board of Corrections, 
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believes that the Idaho Code §20-228 allows them to have 
unchecked discretion in granting to a person time served upon 
parole. The Board of Corrections believes that no one is granted 
time served while on parole unless specifically granted to them 
by the Board. 
It is clear that an inmate has a protected liberty interest 
in being released from confinement/supervision once he has served 
the terms of his sentence. Plumb V. Prinslow, 847 F.Supp. 1509, 
(1994). 
Attached as Exhibit B is the Legislative minutes for the 
1998 legislative term. On page 2 of the minutes, Chairman 
Darrington asks Olivia Craven, (In speaking in terms of credit for 
time served upon parole), 
Mr. Darrington: 
Olivia Craven: 
" •. is the parole commission aware that 
if a Judge imposes a sentence of five 
years fixed, and five years indeterminate 
that this is a ten year sentence? 
" •. Yes, we are aware of this". 
It is clear that when the Board approached the Legislature 
for the ability to either credit or not credit time served upon 
parole, the Board was made aware of the fact that an inmate could 
not be held longer in custody that the maximum term as was 
sentenced by the Court. 
In the case before this Court, the fourteen, (14) year term 
as was ordered by the Court, has been served. Therefore, the 
Appellant is entitled to be released from custody and supervision. 
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3). Is §20-228 Unconstitutional as applied to 
the Appellant? 
Attached as Exhibit A is a copy of the Judgment and sentence 
in this case. 
As previously cited to this Court, on page 2, at lines 1-3, 
the sentencing Court Ordered that the Appellant be, "committed 
to the custody and supervision of the Idaho state Board of 
Corrections, for a period not to exceed fourteen, (14), years". 
§20-228 is unconstitutional as applied to the appellant, 
because of the particular wording of the sentencing court order. 
Under the express terms of the Judgment and Sentence, it is 
mandatory that the Appellant be given credit toward the fourteen, 
(14), year sentence for any time that he has spent in custody, or 
under the supervision of the Board of Corrections. 
Under the express terms of the sentencing order, the only 
time that is not to be counted is any time when the Appellant is 
not under the custody and supervision of the Board of Corrections. 
Because of the unique wording of the judgment and sentence, 
it is clear that if the Appellant is under the supervision of the 
Board, he is to receive credit for this time. Furthermore, the 
combined total amount served, (whether it is in custody or under 
the supervision of the Board), shall not exceed fourteen years. 
As previously cited, the Appellant was sentenced on June 7th, 
1999, and was granted credit for time served in the amount of 
277 days. 
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With these 277 days of presentence credit, the fourteen, (14), 
year term would expire on September 4th, 2012. 
Because of the unique terms of the sentencing order, the Board 
can not take away from the Appellant his IIStreet time". (Street 
time is time served while on parole). 
It would seem to be just and fair if an inmate was not allowed 
to be given credit for time served on parole, after the issuance 
of an arrest warrant. (But credit must be given for time prior). 
But it would seem to violate the principles of Due Process 
of Law if an inmate serves years on parole, is not ever convicted 
of another criminal offense, and he has his street time taken from 
him, without ever being informed of this in person, or given any 
form of hearing whereas he can protest this forfeiture. 
"Due Process has to do with fundamental fairness. A 
denial of which is shocking to the universal sense 
of justice; It deals neither with jurisdiction or 
power, but with the fair administration of such". 
Kinsella V. United states, 361 U.S. 234, 80 S.ct. 297; 
Haygood V. Younger, 769 F.2d 1350, 1354, (1986). 
When the state of Idaho, (By and through the Board of Corrections), 
held the revocational hearings upon the Appellant, the Board did 
not ever inform the Appellant that they were going to take his 
"street time". 
Due Process of Law would demand that the Appellant be given 
notice that he is in jeopardy of losing his street time, or any 
liberty that he is otherwise entitled to. 
The Board has taken from the Appellant a total amount of 11~S 
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days of street time, and has added these days to the end of the 
fourteen year term, thereby violating the Supreme Courts holding 
in the case of In Re Prout, Supra. 
"No hard and fast rule can be laid down as to what is 
or is not Due Process. Due Process must be picked out 
from the facts of each case." Brock V North Carol 
344 u.s. 424, ( ). 
In this particular case, there was no finding by the Board 
, 
of pardons and paroles, during any of the revocational hearings, 
whereas the Board, in the presence of the Appellant, ever informed 
the Appellant that he would forfeit any ot his street time, or the 
time he had served upon parole. 
Nor was the Appellant ever informed, during any of the 
revocational hearings, that the time he had served, under the 
direct supervision of the parole authorities, would be added to 
the end of his sentence. 
To forfeit this street time, and add it to the end of the 
sentence imposed, (When the sentencing order directly ordered that 
the Appellant serve a portion of his sentence under such supervision), 
without ever giving to the Appellant a hearing concerning this 
matter, is a clear denial of Due Process of Law. 
The Appellant requested the "minutes" of the revocational 
hearing(s) to prove that no one ever informed him that he was going 
to forfeit the street time he had served. 
The Board informed the AppelJa~t that they would send these to 
him. The Board d~d not ever do this action. 
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In essence, the Board has taken from the Appellant a total 
of l1f~ days served. 
The Board has done this without the Appellant being present, 
and without ever providing to the Appellant the right to appeal 
this loss. 
Attached as Exhibit C is the Sworn affidavits of two individuals 
who can verify as to what is contained in those affidavits. 
Clearly, Ms. Cynthia Pherigo, (who was present at the Parole 
revocational hearings), is swearing under Oath, that the Board did 
not ever inform the Appelalnt, in person, and during the hearing, 
that the Board was taking any of the street time of the Appellant. 
Just the same, it is clear from the sworn affidavit of Keith 
A. Brown, that case manager Mike Shoen was also present during the 
revocational hearing, and he also did not hear the Board inform 
the Appellant that he was going to forfeit his street time. 
It is unclear how Due Process can be satisfied when the Board 
is not informing the Appellant that he is going to forfeit the time 
that he has served. 
It is unclear how Due Process is being provided to the 
Appellant when he is not given an avenue to appeal the loss of 
the street time. 
It is unclear how Due Process of Law is satisfied when the 
Appellant is never provided any form of notice that he is subject 
to forfeiture of his street time. 
An inmate in Idaho can not refuse a parole. That would result 
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in a disciplinary offense report being issued, and that could 
result in the placement of the offender in the maximum security 
institution for refusing a bed assignment. 
It is clear from the Idaho Code, §20-228 that the Board has 
discretion to grant to an inmate his street time. What is not 
clear is what are the conditions or requirements to the granting 
or the forfeiture of this street time. 
Because there are no set criteria, this has allowed the 
Board to deny to the Appellant equal protection and application 
of the law. 
4). The Board violates equal application of the 
Law, Under the Fourteenth Amendment to the 
United states Constitution, when it grants 
to one offender credit for his street time, 
but for no known reasons, takes it from the 
Appellant. 
Some inmates are released upon parole, commit new felony crimes, 
and when the Board holds the revocational hearings, the Board does 
not take the street time of these men who commit new offenses. 
Yet the Appellant, paid the cost of his supervision, committed 
no new offenses, enrolled in, (under the order of the Board), an 
in-patient drug and alcohol program, (Which cost the Appellant 
$10, 000), and the Board takes the street time of the Appellant. 
(This would include the time the Appellant served in an in-patient 
program) • 
Clearly the Appellant has not been treated the same as those 
offenders whose street time was not taken. Why does one offender 
who is on parole, and violates this parole, lose his street time, 
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yet another offender, (who might very well know a member of the 
Board), who commits a new felony offense, does not lose his 
street time? 
When this type of action occurs, it violates the Equal 
Protection clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the United states 
Constitution. 
"The principle underlying the Equal Protection Clause 
of both the Idaho state Constitution, and the United 
states Constitution, is that all people who are 
situated in like circumstances are treated alike". 
state V. Breed, 111 Idaho 497, 725 P.2d 202, (1986). 
In order for there to be different treatment for different 
offenders, who are situated the same, there must be some form of 
criteria used to treat them differently. 
To allow one offender to lose the time he served upon parole, 
and another offender to not loose this time, and place the loss of 
this time in the hands of someone who does not have any criteria 
to follow, and who has no rules to follow concerning the taking 
of this time, allows a violation of the equal protection clause of 
both state and Federal constitutions. 
As applied to the Appellant, the Idaho Code §20-228 is 
unconstitutional because it denies to the Appellant equal protection 
of the law. 
As applied to the Appellant §20-228 is unconstitutional because 
it provides no avenue to challenqe the action of the Board in taking 
street time from the Appellant. 
Attached as Exhibit D is a copy of documents that proves the 
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Appellant had paid the cost of supervision durinq the time he was 
on parole. 
At the time the Appellant was informed that his parole was 
qoing to be violated, he was given the opportunity to enroll in 
the C.A.P.P.S. proqram. The CAPPS proqram is an alternative to 
havinq your parole revoked. Had the Appellant completed the CAPPS 
proqram, he would have been released upon parole in Januarv of 
2012. 
However, in December/January the Appellant was removed from the 
proqram because he was served with a warrant. It was not until 
after he was served with a warrant that the Board rescinded his 
release date, re-scheduled the Appellant for a revocational 
hearinq, and then took the Appellants street time. 
It brinqs up one very important question; what was it about 
the warrant being served, that made the Board take the str.·eet time? 
Is there some criteria that is not known that says if you have a 
warrant served upon you that you must lose your street time? 
If there is no criteria for the treatmerlt of offenders, and if 
there is no type of criteria for the Roard to follow when the 
Board takes an offenders street time, then how are all offenders 
beinq treated equally? 
5). Does §18-309 mandate that the Appellant receive 
credit post iudqment, for time he has served? 
The Idaho Code, §18-309, divides a criminal defendants time 
served into two broad cateqories. The first sentence of the statute 
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deals with any period of incarceration in a county jail while the 
defendant is awaitinq disposition of the charqe. It is well 
established that this portion of the slatute requires credit for 
prejudqment incarceration that is attributable to the offense 
for which the sentence is imposed. Law V. Rassumsen, 104 Idaho 455, 
660 P.2d 67, (1983); state V. Peterson, 121 Idaho 775, 777, 828 
P.2d 338, 340, (1992). 
It is the second sentence of the statute that is at issue in this 
case. The second sentence of §18-309 addresses the time served after 
entry of judqment. it states that, " ... the remainder of the term 
commences upon the pronouncement of the sentence", implyinq that all 
time spent in CUSTODY after the sentence is pronounced is to be 
credited to the defendant's sentence. Please see, State V. Alber~n, 
135 Idaho 723, 23 P.3d 797, (2001). 
Pursuant to the Idaho Code, ~19-2513, it is stated as follows: 
" .•. the Court shall specify a minimum period of 
CONFINEMENT and may specify a subsequent indeterminate 
PERIOD OF CUSTODY". (Emphasis added). 
It is clear that when the leqislature enacted the provisions 
of ~19-2513, they made a distinction between "CQNFINEMFT\l'T''' Plnr'l 
"CUSTODY"_ Tt- W()111r'l ~ppm t-hPlt- ()nC"P t-hp fixpr'l or t-hp "minimum" 
t-prm i~ ~ervpr'1. t-hPlt- t-he Dri~onpr t-hen woulr'l he in t-he rTlc::",nnv r.f' 
the Board of Corrections. 
It is also clear that G18-309 speaks in terms of "CUSTODY" 
when it addresses credit for time served Post Conviction. 
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In the case of state V. Buys, 129 
(1996), the Court stated, 
"therefore, as a qeneral rule, u 
of time served, whether before j 
entry of the judqment and the i 
counts aqainst the sentence of i 
all time served is attributable 
inr.lunen offense for which the; 
In state V. Albertson, 135 Idaho 723, 
726, and 800, and at headnote #9, this Cou 
"The provisions of Idaho Code 18 
and do not confer discretion to 
sentence". 
Based upon this 
it is clear that any time the Appellant h 
MUST be credited to the underlyinq sentenc 
Which brinqs this arqument back to a 
provisions of §18-309, (Which are mandator 
provisions of §20-228? 
Is time served under CUSTODY of the 
when an inmate is not at "LARGE", 
mandated to be credited to the sentence he 
When the legislature amended §19-2513 
laws of the State of Idaho, it was clear 
served the minimum, " ... per iod of 
be relectsed to the CUSTODY of the Board 
any indeterminate time." §19-2513. 
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09, any period 
. after the 
the sentence, 
t so lonq as 
follows: 






is then to 
to serve 
Because §18-309 states, " ... the remainder of the te 
the pronouncement of the sentence", imply 
in CUSTODY after the sentence is pronounc 
dited toward the sentence, State V. Alberton, 
723, and because the terms of §18-309 are 
served in CUSTODY Post Judgment must be gran 
se §19-2513, clearly depicts that the indeterminate 
served in CUSTODY of the Board of Corrections, it 
any time served in the CUSTODY of the Board of 
be credited toward the discharge of the term as p 
e sentencing Court. 
However, in this particular case, it goes one step 
to this Court, the Judgment and sentencing doc 
is unique. It clearly states that the Defendan 
VISED for more than fourteen (14), years. 
the impasse as to the terms CUSTODY and CONFI 
come into play. 
Appellant has been SUPERVISED by the Board o f 
for more than 14 years then his judgment is 
fulfilled, and he must be released. 
that the Appellant has been supervised and 
custody of the Board of COrrections, the 
Court Exhibit D. 
D is the document that proves that the Appel 
cost of supervision each and every month. 
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CONCLUSION 
Since the year of 2005, the Appellant has paid more than 
$2500.00 toward the cost of supervision. 
Yet the Board has taken the time served for this time period 
when the Appellant was obviously not breakinq the law. (If the 
Appellant would have been breakinq the law, then when the Appellant 
showed up to pay the cost of supervision, he should have been 
arrested, not allowed to pay his fees and qo on his way). It would 
seem to violate Due Process of Law to later take from the Appellant 
this time period. 
The Board has no established criteria that they go by to ascertain 
who will forfeit their street time and who will not. 
The Board has no written rules that establishes criteria as 
to who will forfeit their street time and who will not. 
The Board does not inform everyone, in person that they have 
had their street time taken. (They never informed the Appellant 
of this). 
There is no possible avenue to appeal the forfeiture of 
street time. 
The Appellant has paid, more than $10,000 for an in-patient 
druq proqram, which was approved by the Board. The Board later has 
ordered this time to be forfeited. 
The Appellant, by order of the Board, paid $2,250.00 to take 
a class called Moral Recoqition Therapy. 
The Appellant paid approximately $10,000 in fines and 
restitution. 
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How then can the Appellant have his street time taken, but 
other offenders who are not current with their costs of 
supervision do not? 
How can the Appellant have his street time taken, for a 
technical violation, but other offenders who commit new crimes 
do not? 
How can the Appellant have his street time taken, and never be 
informed of this in person? 
How can the Appellant have his street time taken, and the 
Board who takes it, has no written guidelines to follow when they 
do take it? 
How can the Appellant have his street time taken, and have no 
avenue of appeal for this action? 
How can the Appellant be ordered to be SUPERVISED by the 
Board for a period of no longer than 14 years, having done so, 
and then have the Board say, "What, no .•• you are not done, we 
took your street time from you". 
This is a denial of Due Process and Equal Protection and 
application of the law. 
Attached as Exhibit E is a copy of each and every sanction 
that was ever handed down to the Appellant by the Board, as 
punishment for the violations of the conditions of his parole. 
As can be clearly seen, on none of these disposition forms 
does the Board ever mention a forfeiture of any street time. 
Based on this alone, this Court should enter an Order which 
-21-
that the Writ of Habeas Corpus should be qranted. 
It is also very important for this Court to know of the 
following argument. 
In the Order of the District Court, the Court stated that 
there was no liberty interest in credit for time served upon 
parole, because there was no liberty interest in parole in the 
state of Idaho. 
This is not a factual statement of the law. There may not be 
an entitlement to parole, (Due Process liberty inrpr~qt) hut 
is ~ nue Proces Liberty interest in servinq your sentence on 
parole once certain criteria have been met, and that parole can 
be revoked without the procedural protections of the Due Process 
clause. 
In saying this, it is also clear that an inmate has an 
interest in a correct discharge date. Part of the correct date of 
discharqe would of course be given credit for time served. 
It was error for the District Court to not allow the Petition 
for a Writ of Habeas Corpus to be served upon the Respondent. 
It was error for the District Court to deem the Petition to b 
frivolous. 
It was error for the District Court to order that the 
Appellant must pay the clerks record for appeal, or he could not 
file the appeal. This action is a denial of access to the 
Court. It means one thing in a very clear voice, "if you have 
money, you can appeal, if you. are poor, you can not". 
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And finally, the Appellant is making a claim of denial of 
access to the Court by the state of Idaho, by and through the 
Department of Corrections, not providing the necessary legal 
reference materials to access the Courts. 
For instance, there is no case-law provided to inmates, 
from the United states Supreme Court, or any federal court of 
appeals. There is no cases from the Supreme Court of Idaho. So, 
when the district Court stated, " •.• and the Petitioner has not 
cited to any cases, •... ", and then dismissed the Petition, that 
is a showing of actual harm. The district Court dismissed the 
Petition for a Writ of Habeas Corpus because the Petitioner did not 
cite to any cases that supported his position. 
The Petitioner did not cite to any case-law, because there is 
no case-law available at the prison where he is located. 
It is for the reasons as given that the Appellant would 
request this Court to reverse the District Court, and find that 
the Appellant was ordered to served a sentence of 14 years under 
CUSTODY and SUPERVISION of the Board of Corrections. 
That the Appellant served 7 years in custody, and more than 
7 years under the supervision of the Board of corrections, and 
therefore he has totally completed the terms of the sentence 
which was impose~. upon him by the sentencinq Court. 
Therefore, because of the unique sentencinq Court order, it 
is requested that this Court order the release of the Appellant. 
23-
OATH OF APPELLANT 
Comes now, steven Todd Thompson, the Appellant herein, who 
avers and states as follows: 
I am the Appellant in the case before this Court. I have 
read the enclosed Openinq Brief of Appellant. I know the 
contents thereof and believe them to be true and correct to 
the best of my belief. 
steven Todd Thompson, Dated 
SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN TO before me this , day of 
September, 2012. 
---'--'---"-
~~"~ n ( r%. :-
Noi:a.ry I?UbiC in and for the 
state of Idaho, residing at, 
'-~? j- '" 




IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIFTH JUJICIAL DISTRICT OF THE 
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF TWIN FALLS 




VS tr ) 




Case No.CR 97-3940 
AMENDED 
JUDGMENT OF CONVICTION 
and ORDER OF COMMITMENT 
DOB: 
SS#:  
This matter carne on for sentencing on the 7th day of June 
1999, before the Honorable Daniel B. Meehl, District Judge. 
}\ppearing were Jill Skabronski, Deputy Prosecuting Attorney for 
Twin Falls County, Idaho; and the above-named defendant, Steven 
Todd Thompson, with his counsel Rockne La~~ers, that time having 
been set for imposition of sentence in the above case for Grand 
Theft by Possession of Stolen Property, Idaho Code Section 18-
2403 (4) & 18-2407 (1), a lony. 
THAT WHEREAS, the said defendan~ having been found guilty 
of Grand Theft by Possession of Stolen Property, a felony, having 
occurred on or about Nove:nber 21, 1997 irl the County of Twin 
Falls, State of Idaho and is hereby adjudged to be guilty thereof; 
JUDGMENT OF CONVICTION and ORDER OF COMMITMENT - 1 
IT IS THE ORDER OF THIS COURT that the defendant 
committed to the custody and supervision of the Idaho State Board 
of Corrections, for a period not to exceed urteen (14) years. 
Defendant shall serve a minimum of seven (7) years in custody and 
is sentenced to a subsequent indeterminate period of seven (7) 
years in accordance with Idaho Code Section 19-2513. The precise 
period of time on the indeterminate portion of said sentence to be 
determined by other authorities according to law. Defendant shall 
be given credit for ;2.77 days served prior to sentencing. The 
sentence shall be served concurrently with CR 97-3515, CR 97-4058, 
CR 98-4676 and in Judge Burdick's case CR 98-4681. 
This Court recommends substance abuse counseling while 
incarcerated. Restitution in the amount of $2,334.32 for costs of 
investigation will be ordered. 
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the defendant pay restitution 
to in the amount of $6,232.90 in CR 97-3940. 
Tte defendant is, refore, remanded to the custody of 
the Falls County Sheriff to deli vered by him into the 
custody af the proper of cials at the rtment of orrectians 
to begin se ng his sentence. 
DATSD this L{ \-~day of 
r ' 




SENATE JUDICIARY AND RULES COMMITTEE 
DATE: February 11, 1998 
TIME: 1 :38 p.m . 
PLACE: Room 437 
PRESENT: Chairman Darrington, Senators Boatright, Sorensen, Bunderson, Risch , King, Deide, 
Riggs, and Dunklin 
ABSENT! 
EXCUSED: None 
MINUTES: Senator Boatright moved that the minutes of Monday, February 9, 1998, be approved 
as written. The motion was seconded by Senator Riggs and approved by voice vote. 






Vicki Patterson, representing the Idaho Court Reporters Association , introduced RS 
07645 relating to increasing the per page appellate transcription rate from $2.00 to 
$3.25 per paid . It has been 18 years since the last increase and the current rate is far 
below that of surrounding states and the current private sector rates in Idaho. Unlike 
other state employees, court reporters furnish their own equipment necessary to their 
employment. This legislation was brought at the suggestion of the Speaker and 
Chairman Darrington. 
Senator Deide moved that RS 07645 be introduced to print. The motion was 
seconded by Senator Boatright and approved by voice vote . 
COURT REPORTERS 
Vicki Patterson, representing the Idaho Court Reporters Association, introduced RS 
07646 which provides for funding for replacement court reporters while official court 
reporters take accrued vacation leave. Currently, when an official court reporter takes 
vacation leave, the reporter is required to personally reimburse a replacement reporter. 
Reporters are the only state employees who are required to reimburse a replacement 
out of their own salary. 
Senator King moved that RS 07646 be introduced to print. The motion was 
seconded by Senator Dunklin and approved by voice vote . 
PAROLE 
Olivia Craven, Executive Director for Commission of Pardons and Parole, introduced 
RS 07852 which amends Section 20-120, Idaho Code. The modifications to the statute 
removes subjective criteria for Commission appOintments. 
Senator Boatright moved that RS 07852 be introduced to print. The motion was 
seconded by Senator Deide and approved by voice vote . I, 
___ -+) S 1341: PAROLE 
Olivia Craven , Executive Director for Commission of Pardon and Parole, presented S 
1341 which revises conditions and procedures regarding parole and to hold harmless 




taken by the Commission to parole a prisoner. This legislation would authorize the 
Commission of Pardons and Parole, in its discretion, to allow time on parole to be 
counted as part of a recommitted prisoner's sentence. This would also provide that a 
decision of the State Commission of Pardons and Parole or its Executive Director, when 
carrying out the business of the Commission, to be exempt from claims unless that 
action was done with malice or criminal intent or with gross negligent or reckless, willful 
and wanton conduct. 
Ms. Craven noted that the Commission violated 286 inmates last year and reinstated 38. 
Chairman Darrington said he was concerned with the high number of paroles granted 
and that the number was up considerably. Ms Craven said the high number of paroles 
granted was due in large part because of the thorough in-depth reports prepared by the 
hearing officers. 
Chairman Darrington asked if an inmate was fully aware of the conditions of their 
parole? Ms. Craven said every one of the 286 inmates that violated parole fully 
understood the conditions of their paroie at tile time it was granted. 
Senator Sorensen asked how many cases were continued last year? Ms. Craven said 
ninety cases last year were continued but not all of them were due to being unprepared. 
Senator Sorensen said the Performance Evaluation indicated the continuances were 
for 7 1/2 to 9 months. Ms. Craven said she didn't believe they were continued that long, 
usually the continuation is for less than three months. 
Ms. Craven said the inmates that are granted parole do not have to have a parole plan 
but they do have to have somewhere to go. Arrangements for employment are not 
required, however, they do give them time to find a job. 
Senator Boatright asked what was the reason for the 55% of the 286 inmates violating 
parole? Ms. Craven said most of the time it was because they committed other crimes. 
Senator Sorensen asked how long inmates serve when they violate probation? Most of 
the inmates that violate parole are returned for about 16 months. 
Chairman Darrington asked if the Parole Commission was aware that if a judge gives a 
sentence of five years fixed and five years indeterminate that it is a 1 a-year sentence? 
Ms. Craven said they were aware of that. - .-"'~ 
Senator Risch voiced a real concern with the limited liability provisions of this 
legislation. He asked if the Attorney General's Office had reviewed this legislation. Ms. 
Craven indicated that she though the Attorney General's Office, as well as the 
Governor's attorney, had reviewed it. 
Senator Boatright moved that S 1341 be sent to the Floor with a Do Pass 
recommendation. The motion was seconded by Senator Sorensen and approved by 
voice vote; Senator Risch voted nay. 
GRADING OF THEFT 
Olivia Craven, Executive Director of Commission of Pardons and Parole, presented S 
1342 which increases the dollar amount threshold in certain instances to one thousand 
SENATE JUDICIARY & RULES COM~ 




780 O'Leary Way 
Twin Falls, Idaho 
83301 
County of Twin Falls) 
) 
state of Idaho ) 
ss: AFFIDAVIT 
Comes now, Cynthia pherigo, the affiant hereln, who after 
being duly sworn and upon oath, avers and states as follows: 
1). I am the sister of inmate steven Thompson, #57634. 
2). That I attended a parole revocation hearing tor 
steven Thompson #57634, on October 22nd, 2008. 
3). Also present at this hearing was an Idaho state 
Patrol Officer, (Mr. Keith Thompson). This person 
is not related to inmate steven Thompson, #57634. 
4). A~ the parole revocation hearlng on October 22nd, 
2008, the decision of the parole board was that 
steven Thompson would again be granteci a parole 
upon completion of an anger management program, as 
well as a mental health evaluation. 
5). At no time during this hearing did any member of 
the parole commission, including the director 
Olivia Craven, ever inform my brother, inmate 
Steven Thom.:Json, #57634, that he was not going to be 
granted credit for time served upon parole. This 
1S a period of almost three, (3), years. 
Also, and in the adverse to the above paragraph, 
at no time did any member of the parole commission 
ever inform my brother, that t:he commission was going 
to have him forfeit the "street: time" he had served. 
-1-
6). It was not until several weeks later, (after the 
October 22nd, 2008 hearing), that the Department 
of Corrections sent to my Brother, Inmate steven 
Thompson, #51634, a "time computation sheet", which 
showed that he was not going to be given credit 
for time served while on parole, before any 
reported violations. This is a period of almost (3), 
three years. 
OATH OF AFFIANT 
Comes now, Cynthia Pherigo, the Affiant herein, who avers 
and states as follows: 
I am the Affiant herein. I have read the 
1 know the contents thereof, and believe them 
correct to the best of my belief. 
enclosed affidavit, 
to be true and 
n, 
( /1 (! ~ ,'Ii:. ~ \ l \ .. 1 IN t:t C .. -" ~'l4~<r;;; __ _ 





LjViv(1~1 ~ IJ -.!Y,.-t~ :... 
Nota y Public i 
and for the sta e 
of Idaho, residing 
at, ) 
My Co~mission expires 
on, 
Keith A. Brown, #18291 
I.S.C.I., Unit 9 
Post Office Box 14 
Boise, Idaho 
83707 
State Of Idaho ) 
) 
~C~o~u~n~t~y~O~f~A~d~a~ ______ ) 
SS: AFFIDAVIT 
Comes now, Keith A. Brown, the Affiant herein, who after 
being duly Sworn and upon Oath, avers and states as follows: 
A). That I was personally present in the Institutional 
dining area on or about May 30th, 2012, when inmate 
steven Thompson spoke to Case Manager Mike Schoen. 
B). During the above referenced conversation I heard 
Inmate steven Thompson ask Mr. Schoen if he remembered 
what had occurred during the revocational hearing 
of Inmate Thompson. Whereas Mr. Schoen informed Inmate 
Thompson that he, (Mr. Schoen), had kept notes as to 
what had transpired during the revocational hearing. 
C). I then heard Mr. Schoen and Inmate Thonpson engage 
in a conversation concerning whether or not the liBoard" 
had informed Inmate Thompson that they, (The Board), 
were going to take Inmate -Thompson I s "street time". 
D). Mr. Schoen then informed Inmate Thompson that the 
Board had not ordered his street time to be taken. 
E). Mr. Schoen then stated to Mr. Thompson that he would 
bring his notes and would give a statement to the 
Court only with an Order from this Court directing him 
to do so, but that he would give honest testimony to 
the Court regarding this issue. 
F). During the above referenced conversation there were 
at least three other lnmates present other than myself 
and Inmate Thompson. 
-1-
Further your Attiant sayth not, 
K~ith A. Brown, #182~1 
r:-7-/:L 
bated 
Subscribed and Sworn to betore me thiS, 
ot lv\ ~, 2012. 
day 
-2-
in and for 
Idaho, 
residing at, / 
--,,-,!L=1t~./t:...o~ __ _ 
My commisslon expires on, 
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THOMPSON, STEVEN TODD 
280 HARRISON ST 
TWIN FALLS ID 83301-5129 
I NlVlATE 
OTHER CONDITIONS 
FEE 0.00 MO 
3537 SHOEN, MICHAEL W 
Beginning Total Total Current 
Balance Charges Payments Balance 
0.00 2480.00 2370.00 110.00 
PAGE 
















































































10-0CT COS BILLING 
20-MO 46859364486 
10-NOV COS BILLING 
20-MO 46863035164 
10-DEC COS BILLING 
20-MO 8401779711 
10-JAN COS BILLING 
20-MO 8393720801 
10-FEB COS BILLING 
20-MO 8303783070 
10-MAR COS BILLING 
20-MO 8303784564 
10-APR COS BILLING 
20-MO 8442452441 
10-lVlAY COS BILLING 
20-MO 252712908 
10-JUN COS BILLING 
20-MO 252712918 
10-JUL COS BILLING 
20-MO 252712923 
10-AUG COS BILLING 
20 MO 252712941 
10-SEP COS BILLING 
20-201590107 
10-0CT COS BILLING 
20-8545276492 
10-NOV COS BILLING 
20-412462694 
20-201590139 
10-DEC COS BILLING 
10-JAN COS BILLING 
20-48801568629 
10-FEB COS BILLING 
20-8604596073 
10-MAR COS BILLING 
20-8653907199 



















































































S TAT E 0 F I D A H 0 DATE: 04/09/2012 
DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS TIME: 09:00:46 
SUPERVISION FEES 
THOMPSON, STEVEN TODD 
280 HARRISON ST 
TWIN FALLS ID 83301-5129 
INMATE 
OTHER CONDITIONS 
FEE 0.00 MO 
3537 SHOEN, MICHAEL W 
Beginning Total Total Current 
Balance Charges Payments Balance 
0.00 2480.00 2370.00 110.00 
PAGE 
=:::: = = ==== ============= = == === ::::=== TRANSACTIONS =============================== 
Date Batch Description Amount Balance 
- --------- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
05/01/2007 0019412-0419 10-MAY COS BILLING 50.00 50.00 
05/09/2007 0019432-0210 20-56420436061 50.00CR 0.00 
06/01/2007 0019496-0414 10-JUN COS BILLING 50.00 50.00 
06/06/2007 0019508-0021 20-8714716456 50.00CR 0.00 
07/02/2007 0019558-0407 10-JUL COS BILLING 50.00 50.00 
08/01/2007 0019630-0417 10-AUG COS BILLING 50.00 100.00 
09/02/2007 0019708-0414 10-SEP COS BILLING 50.00 150.00 
09/10/2007 0019729-0091 20-100437323052 50.00CR 100.00 
09/27/2007 0019757-0278 20-100437320918 50.00CR 50.00 
10/01/2007 0019765-0410 10-0CT COS BILLING 50.00 100.00 
10/22/2007 0019802-0285 20-100684514667 50.00CR 50.00 
11/01/2007 0019823-0405 10 NOV COS BILLING 50.00 100.00 
11/15/2007 0019853-0286 20-57297823261 50.00CR 50.00 
12/02/2007 0019881-0403 10-DEC COS BILLING 50.00 100.00 
12/12/2007 0019900-0305 20-950258316 50.00CR 50.00 
01/02/2008 0019933-0399 10-JAN COS BILLING 50.00 100.00 
01/14/2008 0019955-0566 20-08807028819 50.00CR 50.00 
02/01/2008 0019989-0480 10-FEB COS BILLING 50.00 100.00 
02/13/2008 0020009-0289 20-956334926 50.00CR 50.00 
03/03/2008 0020047-0545 10-MAR COS BILLING 50.00 100.00 
04/01/2008 0020099-0548 10-APR COS BILLING 50.00 150.00 
05/01/2008 0020150-0603 10-MAY COS BILLING 50.00 200.00 
05/07/2008 0020160-0077 20-8833784475 50.00CR 150.00 
06/02/2008 0020194 0625 10-JUN COS BILLING 50.00 200.00 
06/02/2008 0020198-0272 20-56434546113 50.00CR 150.00 
06/04/2008 0020205-0051 20-8897906196 50.00CR 100.00 
02/01/2009 0020638-0564 10-FEB COS BILLING 50.00 150.00 
03/01/2009 0020685-0678 10-MAR COS BILLING 50.00 200.00 
03/02/2009 0020690-0078 20-09033512551 50.00CR 150.00 
03/31/2009 0020726-0004 20-09049335670 100.00CR 50.00 
04/01/2009 0020731-0677 10-APR COS BILLING 50.00 100.00 
04/15/2009 0020753-0017 20-09049336388 100.00CR 0.00 
05/01/2009 0020783-0110 10-MAY COS BILLING 50.00 50.00 
06/01/2009 0020833-0169 10-JUN COS BILLING 50.00 100.00 
06/01/2009 0020836-0101 20-09099904473 50.00CR 50.00 
06/19/2009 0020864-0002 20-09099905584 50.00CR 0.00 
07/01/2009 0020882-0082 10-JUL COS BILLING 50.00 50.00 
07/10/2009 0020896-0051 20-09110774937 50.00CR 0.00 
ORR001 
57634 
S TAT E 0 F I D A H 0 
DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS 
SUPERVISION FEES 
DATE: 04/09/2012 
THlfE: 09: 00 : 46 
THOMPSON, STEVEN TODD 
280 HARRISON ST 
TWIN FALLS ID 83301-5129 
INMATE 
OTHER CONDITIONS 
FEE 0.00 MO 
3537 SHOEN, MICHAEL W 
Beginning Total Total Current 
Balance Charges Pal~ents Balance 
0.00 2480.00 2370.00 110.00 
PAGE 
=============================== TRANSACTIONS =============================== 
Date Batch Description Amount Balance 
----------
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
08/01/2009 0020934-0016 10 AUG COS BILLING 50.00 50.00 
08/17/2009 0020960-0056 20-09130299411 50.00CR 0.00 
09/01/2009 0020984-0345 10-SEP COS BILLING 50.00 50.00 
03/01/2011 0021881-0664 10-MAR COS BILLING 50.00 100.00 
03/15/2011 0021905-0007 40-BILLING AD 50.00CR 50.00 
04/01/2011 0021933-0660 10-APR COS BILLING 50.00 100.00 
04/12/2011 0021953-0051 20-14264525806 50.00CR 50.00 
05/01/2011 0021984-0655 10-MAY COS BILLING 50.00 100.00 
05/09/2011 0021996-0361 20-202530087672 50.00CR 50.00 
06/01/2011 0022029-0651 10-JUN COS BILLING 50.00 100.00 
06/06/2011 0022039-0116 20-14305441049 50.00CR 50.00 
07/01/2011 0022085-0653 10-JUL COS BILLING 50.00 100.00 
07/11/2011 0022098-0240 20-14339097671 50.00CR 50.00 
08/01/2011 0022129-0665 10-AUG COS BILLING 60.00 110.00 
08/31/2011 0022172-0029 20-14362427984 60.00CR 50.00 
09/01/2011 0022177-0660 10-SEP COS BILLING 60.00 110.00 
09/27/2011 0022211-0013 20-14362617569 60.00CR 50.00 
10/01/2011 0022222-0650 10-0CT COS BILLING 60.00 110.00 
EXHIBIT E 
***** INMATE COpy ***** 
IDAHO COMMISSION OF PARD0NS AND PAROLE 
NOTICE OF ACTION TAKEN 
TO: THOMPSON, STEVEN TODD 57634 HEARING DATE: 04/24/2012 
LOC~TION: ISCI/UNT09, PRES FACIL POD OO/TIER A/CELL 9/BUNK B 
TYPE OF HEARING: REVOCATION HRG' 
DECI SION OF COt>lMISSION: REVOKE/DENIED 
!: 
PAROLE HEARING NOTES: 
SCHEDULED HEARING DATE:2014-04 
1) You may request an appeal of a parole decision by submitting a Self Initiated Progress 
Report. The first opportunity to submit such appeal is six (6) months following this 
heari:1CJ . 
a) [he o!lly acceptable form is the one approved by the Commission. You can 
obtain such form from your caseworker or by writing the Commission. 
bl The petition must be completed correctly per the instructions or it may 
be returned. 
c) If your first appeal is denied, you can submit appeals annually. 
d) Your appeal must state the reason reconsideration is requested and the 
circumstances that have changed. 
If your hearing was a revocation hearing, you were given the Commission's decision 
regarding parole time credited or forfeited. Your new sentence calculation is 
available two (2) weeks following the hearing. Your caseworker can provide this 
information or you can write to the IDOC Rec0rds office for the information. 
TPD = Tentative Parole Date 
,JTNR = lner 
INS = Immigration and Naturalization Services 
~s = Consecutlve Sentence 
DOR = Disc inary Offense Report 
F'TRD Full Term Release Date 
Coodtlme Release Date 
TO: THOMPSON, STEVEN TODD 
IDAHO COMMISSION OF PARDONS AND PAROLE 
NOTICE OF ACTION TAKEN 
57634 HEARING DATE: 03/19/2010 
LOCATION: ISCI/UNT09, PRES FACIL POD OO/TIER A/CELL 9/BUNK B 
TYPE OF HEARING: REVOCATION HRG 
DECI SION OF COMMISSION: REVOKE/GRANT TPD SCHEDULED HEARING DATE: 
PAROLE HEARING NOTES: 
COMP LETE TC. 
***** INMATE COpy ***** 
1) All parole release dates granted by the Commission are tentative. {Commission 
Rule 350 03.} We make every effort to release you on the Tentative Parole 
Date (TPD) granted, but many factors may inhibit this process. 
a) Your parole plan must be investigated and returned as accepted within a 
reasonable time frame of your TPD. It ~.", important that YOU1: plan has addJ:.-essed 
treatment needs and a stable residence. 
b) Disciplinary problems may be reviewed by the Commission. All DORs received 
after your hearing, or ones that were not known about, will be reviewed by 
the Executive Director and/or the Commission. The Commission may elect to 
void their previous decision. 
c) If the Commission receives information that was not available at the time 
of the parole grant hearing, the Commission may review the information or 
may schedule another hearing, and the TPD may be voided. 
2) Your case worker will assist you with your p2role plan and can advise you if the plan 
has been submitted. Your parole plan must be investigated by field supervisory 
personnel and must be accepted; the only exc~~t~on is if the Commission elected to 
waive this investigation. 
3) If you are housed in a county jailor other facility outside of the state of Idaho, 
an IDOC representative will be in contact with you. 
4) If you are paroling to a detainer, you will receive instructions along with your 
parole release document that you will be expected to follow. 
SPECIAL CONDITIONS: 
1) NO ALCOHOL 
2) FOLLOWUP TREAT 
3 ) PAY RESIST/FINE 
4) NO A3S0C FELON'S 
5 ) TC AFTERCARE 
6 ) MENTL HLTH EVAL 
TPD = Tentati'le Parole Date 
DTNR = Detainer 
INS = Immigration and Naturalization Services 
CS = Consecutive Sentence 
VOR = Disciplinary Offense Report 
FTRD Full Term Release Date 
GTRD ~ Goodtime Release Date 
TO: THOMPSON, STEVEN TODD 
IDAHO COMMISSION OF PARDONS AND PAROLE 
NOTICE OF ACTImT TAKEN 
57634 HEARING DATE: 10/22/2008 
LOCATION: ISCI/UNT09, PRES FACIL POD OO/TIER,A/r~L~ 9/BUNK B 
TYPE OF HEARING: REVOCATION HRG 
DECISION OF COMMISSION: REVOKE/GRANT TPD SCHEuULED HEARING DATE: 
PAROLE HEARING NOTES: 
***** INMATE COpy ***** 
OPEN DATE. COMPLETE ANGER MANAGEMENT. CONTACT WITH CHILDREN ONLY PER COURT 
ORDER. COMMISSION REQUESTS A MENTAL HEALTH EVAL FOR REVIEW BEFORE HE IS 
RELEASED. (1/8 EVAL REV/NFA) 
1) All parole release dates granted by the Commission are tentative. (Commission 
Rule 350.03.) We make every effort to relea. ~ you on the Tentative Parole 
Date (TPD) granted, but many factors may inhiolt this process. 
a) Your parole plan must be investigated and returned as accepted within a 
reasonable time frame of your TPD. It is important that your plan has addressed 
treatment needs and a stable residence. 
bj Disciplinary problems may be reviewed by the Commission. All DORs received 
after your hearing, or ones that were not known about, will be reviewed by 
the Executive Director and/or the CommisJion. The Commission may elect to 
void their previous decision. 
c) If the Commission receives information that was not available at the time 
of the parole grant hearing, the Commission may review the information or 
may schedule another hearing, and the TPD may be voided. 
2) Your case worker will assist you with yom:· parc;'l.e plan and can advise you if the plan 
has been submitted. Your parole plan must be investigated by field supervisory 
personnel and must be accepted; the only exception is if the Commission elected to 
waive this investigation. 
3) If you are housed in a county jailor other facility outside of the state of Idaho, 
an IDOC representative will be in contact with you. 
4) If you are paroling to a detainer, you will ~2ceive instructions along with your 
parole release document that you will be expected to follow. 
SPECIAL CONDITIONS: 
1) NO ALCOHOL 
2) StJB l..BUSE EVAL 
3) PAY RESIST/FINE 
4) NO ASSOC FELONS 
5) NO GAMBLING 
I?D Tentative Parole Dace 
DTNR Detainer 
:~S = Immigration and Naturalization Services 
CS = Consecutive Sentence 
DOR = Disciplinary Offense Report 
FTRD Full Term Release Date 
(;TRD '" Goodti:ne Release Date 
